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THE VIRGINIA "SON OF SAM" LAW:
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO
VICTIM COMPENSATION
Kerry Casey*

Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... '
I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the
press, and prohibits Congress from acting to restrict these rights.2 The
Supreme Court has held that the states too are bound by the restrictive
language of the First Amendment by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
Nevertheless, the Court has allowed certain restrictions on freedom of
speech when the restrictions are narrowly tailored to further compelling
government interests.4 This Note examines whether state legislatures may
limit a criminal's right to tell the story of his crime. If a state legislature
may restrict a criminal's right to profit from the exercise of his5 freedom
of speech, the issue becomes the extent to which a legislature may do so.6
Criminal antiprofit laws have been enacted only recently. The first such
law was passed in response to the "Son of Sam" murderer.7 David
Berkowitz was a psychotic twenty-five year-old who shot thirteen people

*

J.D. Candidate 1994, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2 Id.

3 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 268 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment makes the specific prohibitions of the First Amendment equally
applicable to the states.").
' Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-61 (1990).
5 1 use the pronouns "he," "him," and "his" in reference to the criminal
throughout this Note for simplicity.
6 The Supreme Court answered neither of these questions in its
recent decision in
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). The only thing
the Court decided in that case was that New York's "Son of Sam" law was an
impermissible restraint on free speech. Id. at 512. It reserved the question of whether a
restraint on a criminal's right to profit from the story of his crime will ever be permissible
in light of the guarantees of the First Amendment. Id.
7 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (Consol. 1983), repealedby 1992 N.Y. Laws ch. 618, § 10,
and replaced by N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (Consol. Supp. 1992-93). For a discussion of
the current New York "Son of Sam" law, see infra note 29.
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in New York and wrote letters to the New York papers with the details of
his crimes. 8 He used the pen-name "Son of Sam." 9 His penchant for
fame, as well as his literary talent, prompted the New York legislature to
pass this nation's first "Son of Sam" law," ° a statute requiring criminals
to turn over the profits" from the stories of their crimes for use in
compensating their victims. 12 indeed, the New York legislators reasoned
that such a statute would " 'ensure that monies received by the criminal
under such circumstances shall first be made available to recompense the
victims of that crime for their loss and suffering.' "1.3
In 1977, the New York legislature passed the first "Son of Sam"
law 4 in response to a fear that David Berkowitz, the "Son of
Sam" killer, would write the story of his crimes and profit thereby. 5
At that time, New York already had in place a general law which
sought to compensate victims of a crime through an administrative
agency.'6 The legislature hastily amended the existing statute; the
result was the original "Son of Sam" law.'17 The New York law
became the model for the forty-two other state, 8 as well as the fed8 Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam "Laws and the Speech and Press Clauses,
70 N.C. L. REV. 493, 506 (1992).
9 Id.
10 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (Consol. 1983).
" "Profits," as referred to in "Son of Sam" laws, generally means the proceeds
from a contract or the money received by a criminal for the story of his crime. See, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
12 Epps, supra note 8, at 506.
13Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501, 504 (1991)
(quoting Assembly Bill Memorandum Re: A 9019, July 22, 1977, reprintedin Legislative
Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 823).
14N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (Consol. 1983).
"5Simon & Schuster, 112 S.Ct. at 504.
16Epps, supra note 8, at 506.
17 id.
18 The state "Son of Sam" laws include: ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1991);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-4.1-201 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 9103 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to -32 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 351-81 to -88 (Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 401-414 (Smith-Hurd 1989
& Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 910.15 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to 7321 (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-165 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831 to :1839 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 764 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A §§ 1, 8 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 61 1A.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1993);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-103,

1993]

SON OF SAM LAWS

eral, 19 "Son of Sam" laws. Black's Law Dictionary defines "Son of
Sam" laws as "state statutes providing that any share a criminal might
otherwise have in proceeds from a book or other presentation about his
crime must be placed into an escrow account for the benefit of any victims
of the crime." 2°
Several policy considerations favor protecting the rights of the victim
by enacting "Son of Sam" laws, even if to do so means depriving the
criminal of certain constitutionally-guaranteed rights. First, the victim
should be compensated by the criminal who harmed him.2 ' Second, the
criminal should not be allowed to profit from the story of the crime.22
Third, the victim should not be forced to "relive" the crime when the
media presents the story of it from the criminal's perspective.23
Those opposed to criminal antiprofit laws may assert countervailing
arguments. The most important of these, and the one at issue in this Note,
is the contention that criminals have the same first amendment right to free
speech as other citizens. Furthermore, opponents of "Son of Sam" laws
may advance the media's right to freedom of the press under the First
Amendment.2 ' This latter policy consideration exceeds the scope of this

-104 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1836 to -1842(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217-265
(1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-27 to -33 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-22-22
to -23 (Michie 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01 to .06 (Baldwin 1992 & Supp.
1993); OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 147.005.275 (1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18 (West 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 12-25.1-1 to -12 (Michie Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 23A-28A-1 to -14 (1988); TENN.CODE ANN.§§ 2913-201 to -208 (1980 & Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.art. 8309-1, §§ 3, 16-18
(West Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2-368.19-.21 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV.CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.200.280 (West 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 1-40112(d) (1988). For a discussion and analysis of these laws, see Epps, supra note 8, at 50005 & nn.46-72. The Indiana legislature repealed its original "Son of Sam" law after
Simon & Schuster was handed down, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7-1 to -6, repealed by
Pub. L. No. 2-1992, § 897, but passed a new version, IND. CODE ANN. 5-2-6.3-1 to -7
(West Supp. 1993).
1918 U.S.C. §§ 3681-3682 (1990).
20

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1394 (6th ed. 1990). Of course, the federal government

has a "Son of Sam" statute as well. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-3682 (1990). For the
purposes of this Note, "Son of Sam" law and criminal antiprofit law are
interchangeable.
2 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501, 509
(1991).
22

See, e.g., id. at 510.

23
24

For other asserted justifications for "Son of Sam" laws, see infra note 265.
See Epps note 8, at 528. Some "Son of Sam" statutes place the burden on the

press to meet certain requirements with regard to criminal storytellers, or face liability
themselves. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (Consol. 1983). Other "Son of Sam"
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Note, but remains important as a backdrop for the controversy surrounding
"Son of Sam" laws. The Supreme Court of the United States recently
held New York's "Son of Sam" law over-inclusive and violative of the
First Amendment. 25 The Supreme Court limited its holding in Simon &
Schuster to the New York-type statutes 26 and expressly left unanswered the
question of the constitutionality of other "Son of Sam" laws.27
This Note examines whether Virginia's "Son of Sam" law could
survive a constitutional attack. It begins with a detailed comparison of the
Virginia and New York laws. It then undertakes an analysis of Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Simon & Schuster. Next, Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Simon & Schuster is examined. This
Note also contrasts the Virginia and New York laws with another variety
of criminal antiprofit statute, epitomized by California's "Dan White"
law.28 It examines the constitutionality of the Virginia law in light of the
recent Supreme Court decision in Simon & Schuster, ultimately concluding
that the Virginia law is unconstitutional. Finally, this Note examines other
approaches the Supreme Court could take when faced with a challenge to
a "Son of Sam" law in the future.

laws place the burden on the criminal and the media entity to forfeit the proceeds of the
media venture. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
25 Simon & Schuster, 112 S.Ct. at 511.
26

Id. at 512.

27 Id.

28 CAL.

CIV.

CODE

§ 2225 (West Supp. 1993). California's "Dan White" law is the

equivalent of other states' "Son of Sam" laws. The California law is so named because
it was enacted in 1983 when San Francisco Mayor George Moscone's assassin, Dan
White, was released on parole. Dan White was also convicted for killing San Francisco
Supervisor Harvey Milk. Sue S. Okuda, Comment, Criminal Antiprofit Laws: Some
Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1355 (1988). See
infra notes 168-208 and accompanying text.
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II. THE APPROACH TO "SON OF SAM" LAWS:
NEW YORK 29 V. VIRGINIA

A. The Virginia Criminal Antiprofit Law
On April 9, 1990, Governor Wilder signed Virginia's "Son of Sam"
bill into law. 30 Because it enacted its statute after passage of most of the
other states' "Son of Sam" laws, the Virginia legislature had the benefit
of borrowing from numerous state approaches. Unlike the New York
legislature, which hastily drafted its law while David Berkowitz remained

29

The New York legislature passed a new "Son of Sam" law in 1992, N.Y. EXEC

LAW

§ 632-a (Consol. 1993-93), after the Supreme Court invalidated its original law in

Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501. The 1992 version of New York's "Son of Sam" law
is ambiguous and poorly written. It limits "crime" under the terms of the statute to
felonies. Id. § 632-a(l)(a). However, it is unclear whether a felon must be criminally
convicted in order to be subject to the statutory scheme. Additionally, the law defines
"profits of the crime" broadly and in general terms. Id. § 632-a(l)(b). Thus, the works
to which the law applies are not specified and a party contracting with the criminal is
accountable for determining whether the law applies to their contract. The media entity
that contracts with the felon for the story of his crime still has the obligation to notify the
Crime Victims Board of any payments made or owing to a person charged with or convicted of a felony. Id. § 632-a(2)(a). The responsibility then passes to the Board to notify
victims of the felony that monies are available. Id. § 632-a(2)(b).
Under New York's revised "Son of Sam" statute, the felon's victims have three
years to bring a civil suit to recover monetary damages. Id. § 632-a(3). The benefit of this
scheme, as seems to be the advantage of any criminal antiprofit law, is that the victims
have compensation available despite the fact that the statutes of limitations have expired
for other traditional tort remedies. See id. Victims must notify the Board when they file
actions against the criminal, id. § 632-a(4), so that the Board can make renewed attempts
to notify other victims of the pending suit. Id. § 632-a(5)(a)-(b). The Board also has
the authority under the statute to prevent the criminal from "wasting" the profits of the
crime. Id. § 632-a(5)(c). Means available to the Board to prevent waste consist of all the
remedies available to the victims-plaintiffs, including attachment and injunction. Id.
§ 632-a(6).
The amended New York law does not take anything from the criminal, but rather
makes more funds available to the victims for satisfaction of their claims. Furthermore,
victims who have not filed suit within the statute of limitations period for other tort
remedies have another chance for compensation from the criminal. It appears that the
criminal retains the profits of the story of his crime, subject to the victims' right to obtain
a civil judgment against him. See generally id. § 632-a. This variation of criminal
antiprofit law resembles traditional tort remedies. Indeed, this type of law is not a true
"Son of Sam" law because it does not provide for forfeiture of proceeds into a special
account or fund as most state "Son of Sam" laws do. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2225(b) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) (Consol. 1983); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-368.21 (Michie Supp. 1993).
30 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1965-69 (Va. April 9, 1990).
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on the streets,3 ' the Virginia legislature had the opportunity to consider the
constitutionality of its "Son of Sam" law by taking into account some of
the criticisms of the New York and other "Son of Sam" statutes.32
The Virginia criminal antiprofit law provides that only those persons
who have pled guilty to a felony, who have been convicted of a felony, or
who have been found not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity are
subject to the law.33 The statute further restricts the application of the law
to felons who have physically injured or killed another person.34 For this
class of felons, any proceeds of a contract for the publication of the stories
of their crimes are susceptible to forfeiture.35
Unlike the New York statute, the Virginia law limits the operation of
its provisions to those media ventures 36 in which the "depiction or
discussion of the defendant's crime or an impression of the defendant's
thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime" is "an integral
part of the work."3 Under this statute, a circuit court makes the final
decision as to whether there is "good cause" for requiring a criminal to
forfeit his profits.38 If the court concludes that the proceeds should be
forfeited, the criminal and the media entity contracting with him are then

31 See
32

supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.

The Virginia legislature's concern for protecting the rights of victims, as well as

criminals, is evident from both the substance of the law and the proposed, and
subsequently adopted, amendments. For example, the House Committee for the Courts of
Justice espoused an amendment that provided that the escrow fund be used for certain
enumerated purposes-including compensation to the victims-pursuant to an order of a
circuit court "after motion, notice to all interested parties, and opportunity for hearing .... ." See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.21(B) (Michie Supp. 1993) (emphasis denotes
text inserted by the Committee). Additionally, the Senate Committee for the Courts of
Justice inserted the requirement of "good cause shown" as a prerequisite for any order
by a circuit court that a criminal forfeit the profits of a media project. Id. § 19.2-368.20.
These are just two of the due process protections included in the Virginia scheme.
33 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993).
34 id.
" Id. § 19.2-368.20.
36 Generally, media ventures covered by "Son of Sam" laws are any literary, audio,
or visual endeavor involving the story of the crime, such as books, movies, articles in
magazines or newspapers, tape recordings or records, radio or television shows, and any
live presentations. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(6) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) (Consol. 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp.
1993).
31 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993). Cf N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)
(Consol. 1983) (applying the criminal antiprofit law to any media enterprise undertaken
by the criminal which involves "the reenactment of such crime" or the "expression of
[the criminal's] thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding [such] crime," whether

a major part of the entire work or not).
38 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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responsible for paying over the
monies to the Division of Crime Victims
39
Compensation ("Division").
The victims' of these violent felonies are the beneficiaries under the
Virginia scheme. The Virginia "Son of Sam" law grants supervisory
responsibility to the Division, al an administrative agency much like New
York's Crime Victims Board. 2 The Division holds the forfeited profits in
escrow for five years, during which time victims of the convicted felon
may sue the Division for compensation from the fund. 43 The Division,
however, has no real control over who benefits from the fund. That
discretion remains with the circuit courts of Virginia, subject to the
constitutional due process rights of "interested parties"4u-notice and
opportunity for a hearing. 5 If a money judgment is rendered by a court or
the Workers' Compensation Commission grants compensation to the
victim, the escrow fund may be used to satisfy those awards.46 After the
five-year period expires, money from the escrow account is paid into the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, making it available for the benefit
of crime victims generally.
The Virginia law protects the criminal's rights as well. The criminal
defendant may levy upon the escrow fund to satisfy any fines assessed
against him by a court in Virginia. 8 Additionally, the convicted felon may
obtain a court order giving him access to the escrow fund for the payment
of legal fees incurred in his defense, or appeal, of the criminal charges.4 9
No more than twenty-five percent of the total escrow fund may be used to
subsidize the criminal's defense, however.5 0

39 Id.
40

For the purposes of this chapter of the Virginia law, "victim" is defined as "a

person who suffers personal, physical, mental, emotional, or pecuniary loss as a direct
result of a crime and includes the spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the victim." Id.
§ 19.2-368.19.
41 Id.

N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 621 (Consol. 1983).
43 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.21(A) (Michie
42

Supp. 1993).

4 An "interested party" is defined in the statute as "the victim, the defendant, and
any transferee of the proceeds due the defendant under a contract, the person with whom
the defendant has contracted, the prosecuting attorney for the Commonwealth, and the
Division of Crime Victims' Compensation." Id. § 19.2-368.19.
41 Id. § 19.2-368.21(B).
46 Id. § 19.2-368.21(A)(1).
41 Id. § 19.2-368.21(C).
48 Id. § 19.2-368.21(A)(2).
49 Id. § 19.2-368.21(B)(2).
50 Id.
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B. New York's "Son of Sam " Statute.: The OriginalCriminal Antiprofit
Legislation
Virginia's "Son of Sam" law has never been invoked, nor has there
been litigation involving it, so that its constitutionality is undetermined. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court held New York's "Son of Sam" law
unconstitutional in 1991, fourteen years after its enactment.5 , In the
fourteen years during which the New York "Son of Sam" law was on the
books, it was invoked only ten times, and just a few of those occasions
involved litigation.52 An examination of the Supreme Court decision in
Simon & Schuster,53 as well as an analysis of New York's "Son of Sam"
statute,54 provides some guidance as to the constitutionality of "Son of
Sam" laws generally and that of Virginia55 in particular.
The original New York "Son of Sam" statute differed in some
significant ways from Virginia's criminal antiprofit law. The New York
law applied to a person who had pled guilty to or had been convicted of
a crime in New York, as well as to "any person who ha[d] voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for which
such person [wa]s not prosecuted. ' 56 Persons found not guilty by reason
of insanity also constituted "convicted" persons for purposes of the
law.57 The statute applied equally to any person accused of a crime and
later convicted.58 The law was not restricted to felonies, but rather
applied to any crime.59 Thus, misdemeanors and other seemingly victim51 Simon
52

& Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501 (1991).

Epps, supra note 8, at 509. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp.

1183 (E.D. N.C. 1985) (holding that the federal "Son of Sam" statute (18 U.S.C. § 3681
(1990)) applied retroactively was an ex post facto law, and was an unconstitutional
attempt to impose forfeiture requirements on the defendant); Children of Bedford, Inc. v.
Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1991), judgment vacated, 112 S.Ct. 859 (1992), on
remand, 592 N.E.2d 796 (N.Y. 1992); St. Martin's Press v. Zweibel, 203 N.Y.L.J. 25
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(holding that New York's "Son of Sam" law was within the legislature's "prerogative" for victim compensation); In re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979) (holding, in the David Berkowitz case, that the Victims' Compensation Act of New
York is applicable to the conservator for a convicted murderer who was under a legal
disability).
" 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
14 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (Consol. 1983).
" See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.19 to .21 (Michie Supp. 1993).
56 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (Consol. 1983). Therefore, a person who confessed
to a crime would have been subject to forfeiture under this provision, even though he was
never formally accused, arrested, or convicted for the crime.
IId. § 632-a(5).
58 Id. § 632-a(1).
9 Id. § 632-a(10)(b).
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less 6° crimes subjected the criminal to forfeiture if the other criteria of the
law were met.
The New York statute required forfeiture of any proceeds due the
criminal under a contract for the story of his crime.6 Furthermore, the burden was on the party doing business with the criminal to hand over the
contract to the New York State Crime Victims Board ("Board") and to
pay over the "moneys [sic] which would otherwise, by terms of such
contract, be owing to the person .

.

. accused or convicted or his

representatives." 62

Therefore, the publishing company of a book or the
producer of a film was subject to liability for failing to abide by the "Son
of Sam" law.
The profits of any media endeavor that included the reenactment of the
crime, or any other presentation of the criminal's point-of-view with
regard to the crime, was subject to forfeiture in New York.63 The language
of the New York statute made its provisions applicable to media projects
that included only one sentence about, or a mere reference to, the crime
at issue.'
The proceeds due under a contract with the accused or convicted
criminal had to be paid over to the Board in New York. 65 There was no
separate proceeding at which a court decided whether "good cause" had
been shown so that a criminal would have to forfeit the profits earned by
telling the story of the crime. The profits from the story of the crime were
put in an escrow account where they could be levied on by victims 66 of the

crime.67 Like the Virginia law, the New York statute gave victims five
years after the account was set up to sue civilly and recover damages. 68 A
60 Clearly, only "victims" as defined by the statute may obtain a civil judgment
against the criminal defendant to be satisfied by the escrow account. However, under the
New York "Son of Sam" law, those entities contracting with a defendant had to turn
over any proceeds due the defendant under the contract. Id. § 632-a(1). Thus, it appears
that a criminal could have been made to forfeit his profits for five years even though he
had left no real "victims" to levy on the account. Although such an approach only
forestalled the criminal's receipt of the proceeds, it seemed to defeat the rationale
underlying the criminal antiprofit laws: namely, that the victims of crime should be
compensated. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Ultimately, the criminal still
profited from the story of his crimes.
61 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) (Consol. 1983).
62 Id.
63 Id.

64See id.
65 id.
66

The New York legislature described a "victim," for the purposes of its criminal

antiprofit law, as "a person who suffers personal, physical, mental, or emotional injury,
or pecuniary loss as a direct result of the crime." Id. § 632-a(10)(a).
67

Id. § 632-a(l).

68

Id. § 632-a(l), (7).
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civil judgment must have been obtained in New York before a victim
would be given access to the escrow account.'
The New York criminal antiprofit law provided the criminal with some
access to the account as well. The criminal had the right to secure a court
order allowing him to draw on the account to pay for his legal counsel at
the appellate level.7" The criminal's access to the account was limited to
twenty percent of the total."
In New York, the burden fell on the convicted person to show that five
years had passed and that no proceedings were pending against him.72
Once the criminal had proven this, the Board was required to disburse the
remaining funds to the criminal. 73 Thus, a criminal subject to the New
York statute did not necessarily lose all of his profits.
C. The Virginia and New York "Son of Sam " Laws: How Do They
Differ?
The Virginia "Son of Sam" law applies to a smaller class of
criminals than did the New York law. In Virginia, only felons who inflict
74
bodily harm on or kill another are subject to the antiprofit provisions.
Alternatively, the New York law applied to any criminal, regardless of his
crime, and regardless of whether there were any victims as defined in the
statute.75 Furthermore, any person who admitted to the commission of a
crime was subject to the provisions of the law.76
The Virginia legislature avoided the infirmity of over-inclusiveness
which plagued the original New York law 77 by ploviding that its "Son of
Sam" law applies only to violent felons who kill or do bodily harm to
another.78 In this respect, Virginia's "Son of Sam" law meets the policy
goals of compensating the victims and preventing the criminals from
profiting from the stories of their crimes better than the New York law.
Another way in which the drafters of the Virginia criminal antiprofit
law avoided constitutional catastrophe was by requiring a court to

70

Id. § 632-a(1).
Id. § 632-a(8).

71

Id.

72

Id. § 632-a(4).

69

73 id.

74 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993).
" N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (Consol. 1983). The New York law seemed to apply
to persons convicted of tax fraud in the same way that it applied to persons convicted of
murder. In the tax fraud scenario, no victim would have existed as defined under § 632a(10)(a) of New York's Executive Law.
76 id.

77Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 511 (1991).
71 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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determine whether a criminal should forfeit his proceeds in a particular
case.7 9 Many safeguards inhere in this procedure because the court should
balance the criminal's rights against the rights of the victims. First, the
attorney for the Commonwealth must petition the court to order forfeiture
of the proceeds of the story of the crime. 0 Second, the court hears each
case and decides it on its own merits, based not only on the crime
involved, but also on the wishes and needs of the attorney for the
Commonwealth, the victims, and the criminal. 8 ' Third, the court may only
order forfeiture for "good cause shown." 82
In contrast, the New York law required a party contracting with a
convicted criminal or one accused of a crime to surrender a copy of the
contract for the story of the crime and to pay the Board any proceeds due
the criminal under that contract.83 No judicial or other consideration was
taken of the victims' needs in a particular case. 4 Disbursement of the
proceeds to the Board was mandatory,8 5 and the escrow account existed for
five years, 86 regardless of the crime or the claims of the victims, if any.
The New York legislation did not ensure that the rights of the criminals
were constitutionally protected. Little benefit can be derived from exposing
a criminal to forfeiture of profits due him when victims are not
correspondingly compensated; yet great constitutional harm may result.
The Virginia and New York laws differ also in that the Virginia law
does not apply unless the criminal's depiction or discussion of the crime
comprises an "integral part of the work." 8' In contrast, the New York
law applied regardless of how much of the work included the story of the
crime.88 Again, this difference illustrates how the Virginia statute balances
the rights of the criminal with the goal of victim compensation.
Finally, the New York law provided that the proceeds remaining after
the five-year period be returned to the criminal. 89 The criminal, however,

79 Id. § 19.2-368.20. ("Upon petition of the attorney for the Commonwealth filed
at

any time after conviction of such defendant or his acquittal by reason of insanity and after
notice to the interested parties, a hearing upon the motion and a finding for, the
Commonwealth, for good cause shown, any circuit court in which the petition is filed
shall order that such proceeds be forfeited.").
80 id.
81 Id.
82 Id.

§ 632-a(l) (Consol. 1983).
See generally id. § 632-a (no provision requires a court hearing prior to monies

83 N.Y. ExEc. LAW
84

being paid over to the Board).
85 Id. § 632-a(l).
86

id.

87 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
88 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (Consol. 1983).
89 Id. § 632-a(4).
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shouldered the burden of showing that five years had passed and that there
were no outstanding claims. 90 In contrast, the Virginia law provides that
the proceeds remaining after five years be paid into the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Fund. 9' Thus, it seems that under the Virginia scheme, a
criminal's profits could ultimately be used for the benefit of victims who
did not suffer at his hands. The goal of compensating victims is still met,
and criminals are prevented from profiting from their crimes. Yet the
Virginia approach seems unjust. This provision of Virginia's criminal
antiprofit statute could prove to be its downfall if the law is ever attacked
on first amendment grounds because, despite the Commonwealth's
laudable aims, New York and other states have demonstrated that the same
goal can be accomplished by less restrictive means.
III. NEW YORK'S "SON OF SAM" LAW HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, reviewed New York's "Son
of Sam" law with strict scrutiny.92 Under her analysis, New York had to
demonstrate that its law was necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that the statute was narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 93 The Court
concluded that New York failed to meet this test. 94 An unanimous Court
found the New York "Son of Sam" law unconstitutional. 95
The Simon & Schuster case arose when Henry Hill, mobster and
gangster, contracted with author Nicholas Pileggi and publisher Simon &
Schuster to write Wiseguy, the story of his ignoble career.9 6 The irony is
that Hill was never even prosecuted for his role in these mob activities.97
He received immunity for testifying against others with whom he had

9

Id.

§ 19.2-368.21(C) (Michie Supp. 1993).
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991). The
Court undertook a first amendment analysis; the case did not involve a due process or an
equal protection analysis. See generally id. at 504-12.
9' Id. at 509.
9' Id. at 512 (holding that "[t]he State's interest in compensating victims from the
fruits of crime is a compelling one, but the Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored to
advance that objective").
9' See id. at 504. Justices Blackmun and Kennedy wrote concurring opinions, and
Justice Thomas took no part in the decision. Id. at 512.
96 Id. at 506. Some of Hill's more famous, or infamous, crimes
include robbing
Lufthansa in 1978 and making off with nearly six million dollars in cash and jewelry, and
persuading "two Boston College basketball players to shave points during the 1978-79
season." Epps, supra note 8, at 497.
9' VA. CODE ANN.
9

97

Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506.
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worked, and today is living under the Federal Witness Protection
Program.98
The New York State Crime Victims Board directed Simon & Schuster
to pay the Board the equivalent of the proceeds from Wiseguy that it had
already paid to Hill. 99 The Board claimed to get its authority to demand
payment from the publisher under section 632-a of the New York
Executive Law.1°° In response, Simon & Schuster sued the Board.'0 ' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari-to decide whether the New York "Son
of Sam" law violated the First Amendment.102
Justice O'Connor concluded that New York's criminal antiprofit law
was over-inclusive and that it violated a criminal's right to free speech.'0 3
O'Connor noted that a presumption of unconstitutionality arose in this case
because the government placed a burden on the speech of criminals that
it did not place on any other type of speech." ° Specifically, the New York
"Son of Sam" law imposed a monetary burden on speakers, solely
because of the content of their speech. 0 5 The statute also required
forfeiture of profits of a criminal's speech on topics unrelated to his
crimes. 06 Thus, the law ran contrary to the Supreme Court's consistent
holdings that the government may not keep selected views from the
marketplace of ideas. 0 7 O'Connor further contended that characterizing a
speaker as "media"-the publisher-or "nonmedia"-the criminal-was
irrelevant to the analysis because a state cannot "impose content-based
financial disincentives on any speaker."'0 8
New York asserted two interests that the Court found compelling.'"
The State had a valid interest in demanding that those who harm people
should compensate them." 0 Furthermore, the State had a compelling
interest in preventing criminals from reaping the profits of their crimes."'
Thus, the victim should benefit at the expense of the criminal, because the
criminal has benefitted indirectly from the harms inflicted on the victim.
The Court, however, took issue with the Board's narrower justification for

98 Id.

99Epps, supra note 8, at 499.
100Id.
101 Id.
102

Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.

'03 Id. at 512.
'04
Id. at 508.
1o5id.
'06See

N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (Consol. 1983).
'0oSee Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
108 Id. at 509.
'o9

10

Id. at 509-10.
Id. at 509.

,..
Id. at 510.

508

WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:2

the "Son of Sam" law-the State's interest in "ensuring that criminals
do not profit from storytelling about their crimes before their victims have
a meaningful opportunity to be compensated for their injuries"-which the
Court held to be an insufficient justification for the law.' 12 O'Connor also
observed that the Board could not rationalize why the victims should be
compensated out of the profits from the story of the crime rather than from
the criminal's assets in general." 3
Although the Court acknowledged that New York had two compelling
justifications,' 4 it held that the law was not narrowly tailored to meet
those goals." 5 The legislature's intent was immaterial, the Court
concluded, because the effect of the legislative scheme was to discriminate
against criminals." 6 Furthermore, other alternatives were available to the
New York legislature. The Court cited traditional tort remedies, restitution
orders at sentencing, and prejudgment attachment proceedings." 17 All of
those compensation schemes were available in New York at the time." 8
Justice O'Connor hinted that there was an under-inclusiveness problem
with the New York statute, but ultimately refused to address that issue." 9
She noted that the State had reasons for benefiting victims with the "fruits
of the crime," and yet the State had no rationale for limiting the source
of such compensation to speech about the crime.
12" A law that singles out
21
Amendment.'
First
the
under
speech is suspect
The Court focused on two main problems with the New York criminal
antiprofit law. First, the law applied to any work that included the criminal's thoughts and opinions on the crime, even if the reference to the

112

113

Id.
Id. ("The distinction drawn by the Son of Sam law has nothing to do with the

State's interest in transferring the proceeds of crime from criminals to their victims.").
114 Id. at 509-10.
115 Id. at 512.
116 Id. at 509.
117 Id. at 505, 509.
118 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 1311 (forfeiture actions), § 6201 (grounds for
attachment), § 5225 (payment or delivery of property of judgment debtor) (Consol. Supp.
1992-93); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 420.10 (Consol. Supp. 1992-93) (collection of fines,
restitution, or reparation); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (Consol. Supp. 1992-93) (restitution
and reparation).
19 Id. at 511 & note. A "Son of Sam" law could be considered under-inclusive if
it does not provide access to all income and assets of a criminal-an approach which
would benefit the victims financially. The constitutional issue of under-inclusiveness arises
when a legislature chooses to deal only with some, but not all, aspects of a problem.
' 0 Id. at 511.
121 See id at 508 ("Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the
basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.")
(citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
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crime was only a minimal or incidental part of the work.'2 2 Second, the
law defined criminal very broadly. 123 Under New York's definition,
persons who were convicted or accused, who pled guilty, who were found
not guilty by reason of insanity, or who admitted to criminal acts without
being accused or convicted, were all equally subject to the forfeiture
provisions of the New York "Son of Sam" law. 124 The result was that the
New York law applied to many "criminals" as well as to many media
ventures. 25 The real problem, however, was that the law "reache[d] a
wide range of literature that d[id] not enable a criminal to profit from his
26
crime while a victim remain[ed] uncompensated."'
The Court failed to address additional issues that would have been
helpful in analyzing the constitutionality of other "Son of Sam" laws.
For example, the majority did not examine the question of whether a
"Son of Sam" statute could ever be constitutional. 2 7 Furthermore, it
declined to confront the issue of whether the amorphous phrase "profits
of crime" even included book royalties. 28 Finally, although the Court
discussed the content-based nature of the law, it concluded that
characterizing, it as content-neutral or content-based was unnecessary
because the law was over-inclusive and could
not coexist with the free
129
Amendment.
First
the
of
speech guarantees
Justice Kennedy would have provided criminals with even broader first
amendment protection. 30 In his concurring opinion, Kennedy took a more
absolute approach to first amendment jurisprudence.' 13 He rejected the use
of the strict scrutiny test in first amendment cases, reserving that approach
for equal protection analyses. 132 Kennedy urged the Court to ask only
whether the restriction was content-based. 133 An affirmative answer to that
122 Simon

& Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511.
id.
124 Id. at 511. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(5), (10)(b) (Consol. 1983).
125 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511.
123

126 Id.

127See

id. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Most other States have similar

legislation and deserve from this Court all the guidance it can render in this very sensitive
area.").
121 Id. at 510.
129Id. at 511-12.
130 Id. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, A TREATISE ON THE
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 82 (Supp. 1992).
132 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512-13 (Kennedy,

J., concurring) ("[R]esort to the

[strict scrutiny] test might be read as a concession that States may censor speech
whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so.").
' Id. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring). A content-based regulation is one that restricts
speech based on its message and hence can rarely withstand constitutional scrutiny. Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). However, content-based restrictions
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inquiry would mandate a holding that the law was unconstitutional and
would end his analysis.' 34 Kennedy also reconciled the cases in which the
Court had taken a strict scrutiny approach or one like it.135 Those tests had
136
been applied in cases in which the law at issue was not content-based.
If a law is content-based, Kennedy reasoned, it is unconstitutional, making
137
further analysis extraneous.
Justice Kennedy concluded his concurring opinion with two caveats:
38
that "raw censorship" should never withstand constitutional scrutiny,
and that the protections of free speech and free press as provided for in the
First Amendment were gradually weakening. 39 In summary, his opinion
supports the argument that all "Son of Sam" laws are unconstitutional
because they restrict speech on the basis of content." "
IV. CAN A "SON OF SAM" LAW EVER BE CONSTITUTIONAL?

Justice Kennedy hinted that all "Son of Sam" laws violate the first
amendment guarantee of free speech.14 ' Any content-based regulation will
42
not withstand constitutional attack under Justice Kennedy's approach.
O'Connor, on the other hand, expressly reserved the question of whether
criminal antiprofit statutes may be permissible. "43 In the future, the Court
should conclude that a "Son of Sam" law can be constitutional if it takes
the criminal's interests into consideration and if it is not over- or underinclusive. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Simon & Schuster could be the
foundation for such an approach. This type of law would be difficult, if

have been upheld if they restrict speech in an unprotected category-obscenity, incitement,
and defamation, for example; if they protect another constitutional right; if they are
directed at nonspeech elements and there are only secondary effects on speech; or if they
limit the time, place, or manner of speech. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 514-15
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
131 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Of course,
Kennedy recognized that those content-based regulations governing the "historic and
traditional categories" would be upheld. Id. at 514 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Those laws
which restrict obscenity, defamation, and incitement, for example, may be permissible
statutory schemes. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). One can hardly imagine that a "Son of
Sam" law would fit into one of these categories such that it would be upheld by the
Court even though content-based.
' Id. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
138 Id. at 515 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
0oSee supra notes 133-34.
141 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
142 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"41 Id. at 511-12.
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not impossible, to fashion, but Epps' model law, described below, comes
closest to being a constitutional "Son of Sam" law.'"
A. A Model CriminalAntiprofit Law
Garrett Epps has proposed the most narrowly drawn "Son of Sam"
law imaginable. 145 His model remedies, to a large extent, the overinclusiveness which plagued New York's "Son of Sam" law in Simon
& Schuster, and offers a less restrictive alternative. This narrowly drawn
law is aimed only at convicted criminals who have committed "truly
heinous crimes." 146 Furthermore, the law makes only criminals subject to
forfeiture, without exposing the media to liability. 147 Additionally, proceeds
from the story of a crime are sequestered only after an individual
determination, made by the court, on the motion of an adverse party, with
notice to all interested parties.1 48 Then, upon an order of the court, the
forfeiture provisions apply only to "monies from a specific expressive
project by a specific criminal."1 49 Only individual victims who obtain civil
judgments are compensated, and there is no forfeiture to a general crime
victims' fund.15°
If the Supreme Court were to hold a "Son of Sam" law constitutional, Epps' model would provide the best example. Therefore, this
scheme should be the model for states amending their laws in response to
the decision in Simon & Schuster. Epps, however, urges that the first
amendment guarantees are paramount to the victims' interests even when
a statute is very narrowly drawn. 151 He asserts that no "Son of Sam" law
144

See Epps, supra note 8, at 534. Of course, a "Son of Sam" law like New York's

revised statute is not a pure "Son of Sam" law as are the original New York, Virginia,
and California laws. See supra note 29. Presumably, a law which compensates victims by
making the profits of a criminal's story, as well as any other assets he might have,

available to his victims is not a pure "Son of Sam" law. New York's revised law can
properly be considered a second-generation "Son of Sam" law. These new "Son of
Sam" laws may raise constitutional issues beyond the scope of this Note.
141Id. at
146

534-35.

Id. at 534. By "truly heinous crimes," Epps means "violent felon[ies]." Id.

147 Id.
148

id.

149 id.

0 Id. at 534-35.
"' See id. at 535. The free speech issue in "Son of Sam" laws involves a criminal's
right to tell the story of his crime. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20. The right
to free speech is a constitutionally-protected right under the First Amendment. A victim's
right to compensation for his suffering and his right not to be forced to relive the crime
are statutorily-protected rights. See Epps, supra note 8, at 506. Constitutional guarantees
override statutory rights. However, a criminal is not always entitled to full protection of
his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (federal
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could be narrowly tailored so that it could further nonspeech purposes
without impermissibly burdening a criminal's right to freedom of
speech. 52 Epps' view can be harmonized with that of Justice Kennedy
because both call for broad first amendment protection. 153
If the Court were faced with a narrowly drawn statute, Justice
Kennedy's analysis in Simon & Schuster would not necessarily win over
a majority of the Court. No Justices joined in Kennedy's concurring
opinion.5 4 Justice Kennedy's position does comport with traditional first
amendment jurisprudence, so that aspect of it might encourage the Court
to retreat from Simon & Schuster. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court
in Simon & Schuster, conceded that other alternatives existed for
compensating criminals in New York.1 55 In the future, the Court should
continue to find that less restrictive alternatives are available and hold that
most, if not all, "Son of Sam" laws are unconstitutional. Epps urges that
changes in state restitution laws could provide access to criminals' other
assets and, thus, would be an appropriate avenue through which states
could meet
their interests without violating criminals' rights to freedom of
56
speech.'
B. Virginia s "Son of Sam" Law Is Not as Narrowly Tailored as
Possible
Although Virginia's "Son of Sam" law is not over-inclusive in the
ways that New York's law was, 157 it nevertheless is not the least restrictive
alternative available. However, the Virginia law and Epps' model law are
identical in several ways. Both laws are aimed at criminals who are
firearm statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a firearm does not violate fifth
amendment due process despite the fact that the predicate felony may be subject to
collateral attack on constitutional grounds); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976)
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not "entitle[ ]
a state prisoner to a hearing when he is transferred to a prison the conditions of which are
substantially less favorable to the prisoner, absent a state law or practice conditioning such
transfers on proof of serious misconduct. . ."); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53
(1974) (holding that equal protection rights are not violated when a state denies a
convicted felon the right to vote).
152 Epps, supra note 8, at 535 ("Under this analysis, a "Son of Sam" law cannot
survive unless it is narrowly tailored to further its legitimate nonspeech-related
purpose-compensation of victims, not compensation of victims solely from the proceeds
of expressive activity.").
151 Id. at 535; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 51215 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
156 Epps, supra note 8, at 542.
'5

See supra notes 103-26 and accompanying text.
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convicted or acquitted by reason of insanity, or who plead guilty.'58 They
apply only to violent felons-those who kill or inflict bodily harm on
another.'59 An individual determination made by a court, after notice to all
interested parties, triggers the operation of the laws.'
However, Virginia's statute and Epps' model criminal antiprofit law
differ in other respects. First, in Virginia, the attorney for the Commonwealth petitions the court for an order of forfeiture.'16 In contrast, Epps'
model provides that an adverse party shall move for forfeiture in a
particular case.' 62 This difference, however, is inconsequential in terms of
a first amendment evaluation because this distinction does not affect the
speaker's rights. Second, the Virginia law applies a criminal's forfeited
monies to the victims of that criminal. 63 Epps' model is in accord with
this principle. 64 The two approaches diverge, however, because the
Virginia method provides that after the five-year period for claims has
passed, all of the forfeited monies are to be pooled in the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Fund. 165 Under this scheme, a criminal is forced to
compensate victims other than those who suffered injustices at his hands.
Epps specifies that sequestered profits should be used only to compensate
individual victims who obtain civil judgments, with no forfeiture to a
general crime victims' treasury."
Assuming a "Son of Sam" law could be constitutional, a strict first
amendment analysis would find the Virginia law invalid because it is
overbroad. The Virginia statute takes money away from a criminal to
compensate the criminal's victims and then provides that the criminal loses
67
access to the money even after his victims have been compensated.
C. The CaliforniaApproach: A Narrowly Tailored Alternative
The California criminal antiprofit law 168 is a narrowly tailored law that
might pass muster under even the strictest analysis. The California law has
never been invoked.169 The California and Virginia statutes are similar, and
158 VA. CODE ANN.
"9

160

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993); Epps, supra note 8, at 534.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993); Epps, supra note 8, at 534.

161 VA. CODE ANN.
162 Epps,
163

§ 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993); Epps, supra note 8, at 534.
§ 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).

supra note 8, at 534.

VA. CODE ANN. §

19.2-368.21(B)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993).

"6Epps, supra note 8, at 534-35.
§ 19.2-368.21(C) (Michie Supp. 1993).
Epps, supra note 8, at 535.
167 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
168 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1993).
169 Okuda, supra note 28, at 1356. Litigation arose under the New York and New
165 VA. CODE ANN.

"

Jersey "Son of Sam" laws, but no other state, nor the federal, "Son of Sam" law had
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yet they differ in significant ways. Under the California scheme, only a
convicted felon, one who pleads guilty to a felony, or one found not guilty
by reason of insanity of a felony committed in California is subject to the
law.17° "Felony" includes any felony as defined by California or United
States law.' 71 In contrast, Virginia's law applies to felonies resulting in
bodily harm or death of another. 172 The Virginia Code therefore applies to
fewer felons than the California statute and is more narrowly drawn in that
respect. 173 Nevertheless, the California law implies that there must be a
victim in order for the proceeds of a criminal's storytelling to be put in
trust. 174 The Code requires the Attorney General of California to prove that
it is more probable than not that there will be beneficiaries before a court
175
orders imposition of a constructive trust.
In Virginia, the attorney for the Commonwealth may file a petition at
any time after the felon's conviction or acquittal by reason of insanity and
after notice has been given to interested parties.176 A hearing is held, and
if the attorney for the Commonwealth shows "good cause," the circuit
court in which the petition was filed must order forfeiture of the proceeds
of the felon's storytelling.177 There is a similar provision in the California
Code whereby the Attorney General may bring an action in a California
superior court asking that a trust be established with the proceeds of a
gone to the courts when the Supreme Court decided Simon & Schuster. See supra note
52 and accompanying text; Fasching v. Kallinger, 546 A.2d 1094 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) (holding that New Jersey's "Son of Sam" law was not meant to apply
retroactively), cert. denied, 555 A.2d 623 (N.J. 1989).
170 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
71 Id. § 2225(a)(2).
172 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993).
173 Under the California scheme, a white collar criminal and a murderer are both
subject to the imposition of an involuntary trust. However, because the California Attorney
General must show that it is more probable than not that there are beneficiaries who have
potential claims against the trust, there is an implied requirement that there be an
ascertainable victim before a court will impose a trust. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(e)(3)
(West Supp. 1993). The result of this approach may be that some criminals are being
unjustly enriched (those who have no ascertainable victims). See Okuda, supra note 28,
at 1358-59. However, if the State's interest is in compensating victims and there are no
victims, then perhaps the law should not apply. Id. at 1359.
171 See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(e)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
' Id. The California involuntary trust statute defines a "beneficiary" as,
a person who, under applicable law, other than the provisions of this section, has
or had a right to recover damages from the convicted felon for physical, mental, or
emotional injury, or pecuniary loss proximately caused by the convicted felon as a
result of the crime for which the felon was convicted.
Id. § 2225(a)(4)(A). If the beneficiary dies, the beneficiary's estate or another person may
sue on the beneficiary's behalf. Id. § 2225(a)(4)(B)-(C).
176 VA. CODE ANN. §
177 id.

19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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felon's story about the crime. 178 The action may be brought "within six
months after the receipt of proceeds by a convicted felon or six months
after the date of conviction, whichever is later."' 179 The California statute
also expressly provides that the Attorney General prove two things: first,
that the proceeds at issue meet the statutory definition of proceeds subject
to forfeiture under the involuntary trust provision, and second, that
establishing a trust is necessary because there are beneficiaries who could
take under the law. 180 If a court finds that these prerequisites are met, it
must order imposition
of an express trust. 18' Thus, both statutes require that
82
exist.
a victim
Under both the California 183 and Virginia 184 laws, the proceeds of a
criminal's storytelling that may be reached are those received for the sale
of his story. The California and Virginia laws apply to the same types of
storytelling mediums. 85 However, the Virginia Code states that the felon's
treatment of the crime in a particular work must be an "integral part of
the work."' 186 Thus, it seems that more works are excluded from the
operation of the Virginia Code than are excluded under the California
Code, which applies to any "depiction, portrayal, or reenactment of a
felony ... [which is more than] a passing mention of the felony, as in a
footnote or bibliography."' 187 Yet, the Virginia Code does apply to the
mere discussion of the defendant's crime or "an expression of the
defendant's thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime" if it
is "an integral part of the work,"'' 88 whereas the California Code requires
the "depiction, portrayal, or reenactment of a felony."' 89 Furthermore, a
California court considering forfeiture in a particular case'90 might find that

CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(e)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1993).
Id. (emphasis added).
'10 Id. § 2225(e)(3).
1

181

Id.

182

Cf. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (Consol. 1983) (requiring automatic forfeiture of

the profits of a criminal's storytelling without an independent judicial determination).
183 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(9) (West Supp. 1993).
184 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
185 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(6) (West Supp. 1993) (" 'Materials' means books,

magazine or newspaper articles, movies, films, videotapes, sound recordings, interviews
or appearances on television and radio stations, and live presentations of any kind."); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993) (applying to "a movie, book, newspaper,
magazine, radio or television production, or live entertainment [or publication] of any
kind...").
186 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
187 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(7) (West Supp. 1993).
188 VA. CODE ANN. §

189 CAL. CIV. CODE
190 Id. § 2225(e).

19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).

§ 2225(a)(7) (West Supp. 1993).
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materials which include minimal references to a criminal's felonies are not
subject to the provisions of the Code.
Under the California statute, an involuntary trust is set up with the
proceeds from the convicted felon's storytelling.1 91 Virginia takes a similar
approach by setting up an escrow fund. 92 In both states the victims, or
beneficiaries, are entitled
to file actions against the fund, or trust, to
193
receive compensation.
The state holds the monies for five years in both California and
Virginia. 194 In Virginia, after the five-year period expires, the remaining
monies are put into the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund. 95 In
California, however, the Code does not specify whether the criminal will
receive the funds remaining in the trust at the end of the statutory
period. 196 The issue of what becomes of the criminal's profits after the
victims are compensated is a key factor in the constitutionality of "Son
of Sam" laws. Thus, it is imperative to a first amendment analysis to
know whether the proceeds will be returned to the criminal or whether
they will be paid into a general victims' compensation fund under the
California scheme.
The California "Dan White" criminal antiprofit law differs in three
other significant ways from the Virginia statute. First, the proceeds placed
in an involuntary trust under the California law are available to the
victims, or other beneficiaries, less any monies paid to them from the
Restitution Fund, 197 restitution paid by the felon to satisfy a court order, 9 s
or any other money paid by the criminal in satisfaction of a judgment. 99
By using this formula, the California scheme accounts for the fact that the
beneficiaries of the law have other means available to them for
compensation.
Second, before it can distribute monies to the beneficiaries, a California
court must order payment of any outstanding fines, costs borne by the
government for the felon's defense, and attorney's fees related to the

'9'

Id. § 2225(b).

192 VA. CODE ANN.

§ 19.2-368.21(A) (Michie Supp. 1993).

193 Id.

§ 19.2-368.21; CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(c) (West Supp. 1993).
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b), (e)(3) (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2368.21(C) (Michie Supp. 1993).
195 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.21(C) (Michie Supp. 1993).
196 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2225(b), (e)(3) (West Supp. 1993); but see Okuda, supra note
'94

28, at 1359 ("The court makes final disposition of the trust to the beneficiary. If no
beneficiaries file claims against the trust within the five year trust period, the convicted
felon receives the trust funds.").
197

CAL. CIV. CODE §

2225(a)(5)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1993).

198 Id. § 2225(a)(5)(C)(ii).
199 Id. §

2225(a)(5)(C)(iii).
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prosecution of the felony. z° Payment of the felon's debts precedes
payment of the beneficiaries' claims, but at least ten percent of the
proceeds are reserved for the beneficiaries.2 °' Of course, any proceeds
remaining after the felon pays the government and his attorneys will be
available to the beneficiaries as well. 2 Thus, the California statute takes
the criminal's pecuniary obligations to the government into account, at the
expense of his victims.
The Virginia law, however, puts the needs of the victim first. Whereas
the criminal can put as much as ninety percent of the proceeds of his
storytelling toward his expenses under the California statute, in Virginia
"[n]o more than twenty-five percent of the total proceeds in escrow may
be used for [the felon's] legal representation. ' 203 The escrow fund,
however, may be levied upon to pay any fines or costs owed by the
felon. 2° In this way the interests of the State and the criminal are balanced
against the interests of the victims.
Finally, the California law does not require notice to the victims of a
crime that monies are available.2 5 This practice seriously undermines the
policy goals of the State in enacting such a law because victims will not
be fully compensated if they do not know that a trust exists for their
benefit.20 6 The Virginia law, however, requires the attorney for the
Commonwealth to give "notice to the interested parties" before bringing
an action for forfeiture against a criminal storyteller.2 7 Thus, under the
Virginia approach, victims are informed that proceedings are underway,
208
and if an escrow fund is established, they are aware of it.
V. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE VIRGINIA STATUTE

The original New York "Son of Sam" law was over-inclusive in
ways that the Virginia statute is not. Therefore, the Supreme Court's
concerns about the breadth of the original New York law are not realized
in Virginia's criminal antiprofit provisions. 20 9 First, under the original New
200

Id. § 2225(d).

201

Id.

202

id.

203

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.21(B)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993).
Id. § 19.2-368.21(A)(2).

204
205

206

See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1993).
Id.

207 VA.
208 The

CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
unconstitutional New York law also had a notice requirement so that victims

were apprised of the existence of the escrow account. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2)
(Consol. 1983).
209 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501, 511 (1991).
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York scheme, a criminal who contracted to sell the story of his crime had
to automatically forfeit his proceeds regardless of whether the person was
ever convicted or even formally accused. 2'0 The Virginia approach applies
only to convicted felons 211 who have done bodily harm to or killed
another.21 2 Thus, the Virginia Code defines "defendant" clearly and
unambiguously; the definition is neither vague nor overbroad, and there
can be no question about those to whom the statutory scheme applies.
Second, New York's original statute pertained to all works by a criminal
that included the expression of the criminal's thoughts and feelings about
the crime, no matter how small a part of the entire project.1 3 The Virginia
Code excludes criminals from the operation of the law unless the story of
the crime is an "integral part" of the literary or media venture.214
Aside from these differences, the Virginia law has some procedural
protections which would favor finding the law constitutional. Profits from
the story of a crime are not automatically forfeited, but rather the attorney
for the Commonwealth must decide to file a petition for an order that the
proceeds be forfeited. 215 Therefore, the parties contracting with a convicted
criminal do not have the responsibility for determining which works may
be subject to the law. Thus, media entities probably do not run the risk of
liability themselves.
Furthermore, "good cause" must be shown, a hearing must be held,
and all interested parties must be notified before a court concludes that a
criminal should forfeit his profits.216 These requirements serve two
important functions. First, a criminal is not subject to automatic forfeiture,
but rather each case is considered individually and on its own merits.
Second, the victims are notified that this avenue is open, giving them the
opportunity to testify at the hearing and to sue if the court orders
forfeiture. Clearly, a criminal should not be allowed to profit from his
crime and a victim should be compensated. The Virginia scheme balances
the two interests on a case-by-case basis, protecting both the rights of
criminals and those of victims.

"1 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (Consol. 1983). The law applied by its terms to
one who admitted to the commission of a crime. Id.
21' The law also applies to those who plead guilty and those who are found not guilty
by reason of insanity. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993). New York's
law applied to these categories of criminals as well. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b)
(Consol. 1983).
212 VA. CODE ANN.

§ 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993).

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (Consol. 1983). Thus, a criminal's profits were subject
to forfeiture if the work contained only one sentence about the crime.
214 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
215 Id.
216 id.
213
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Potential problems, however, inhere in the Virginia criminal antiprofit
law. The statute places no restrictions on where the felony must have
occurred.21 7 A constitutional analysis by the United States Supreme Court
could result in a finding that the law is overbroad in this regard because
the Virginia legislature seeks protection of victims outside of Virginia-people who are not within its jurisdiction.
Additionally, after an order of forfeiture is issued, the criminal and the
media entity must pay over all proceeds due under the contract.2 8 It is not
clear whether the person contracting with the felon is responsible for
monies already paid to the criminal which he may have spent or may
refuse to hand over. In reality, then, the Virginia legislature might not have
overcome the problem of "double liability" of the media entity which
was encountered under the original New York scheme.21 9
Finally, in Virginia, the money remaining in the escrow fund when the
five-year statutory period expires must be paid into the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Fund. 220 The goal of compensating a victim with the
proceeds of the story of the crime is undermined because funds are pooled
in a reservoir for general victim compensation. A criminal has minimal, if
any, financial incentive to tell the story of his crime because all proceeds
are forfeited regardless of the amount needed to compensate the victim.
Furthermore, the law requires only that twenty-five percent of the proceeds
be available to the defendant to pay for his legal representation. A chilling
22
effect on speech might therefore result. '
In a challenge to the Virginia law, the Supreme Court should find the
Virginia "Son of Sam" law unconstitutional in light of the First
Amendment and the decision in Simon & Schuster.222 The Supreme Court
in Simon & Schuster found constitutional infirmity with the New York
scheme because "[i]t single[d] out income derived from expressive
activity for a burden the State places on no other income, and it [wa]s
directed only at works with a specified content. ' 223 Therefore, the Court
concluded, the New York statute was impermissibly content-based.224
Virginia's "Son of Sam" law 225 is similarly content-based. Additionally,
217See
218

generally id. § 19.2-368.19 to .21.

Id. § 19.2-368.20.

See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (Consol. 1983).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.21(C) (Michie Supp. 1993).
221 A criminal may wish to tell his story for several other reasons: (1) because he
wishes to compensate his victims; (2) because he wants his side of the story available to
the public, perhaps to clear his name; or (3) because he hopes to become famous and
wants to be in the public spotlight. These reasons seem far-fetched and unlikely, however.
222 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501 (1991).
219

220

223

Id. at 508.

224 Id.
225

See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.19 to .21 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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the Court found that the New York legislature had compelling interests in
compensating victims of crimes and ensuring that criminals did not profit
from their crimes. 226 The N
New York law, however, was not narrowly
tailored to meet these interests because it only required forfeiture of those
assets related to "storytelling. ' 227 Virginia's "Son of Sam" law also
targets only speech-related assets for forfeiture. 228 There are undoubtedly
less restrictive and less ambiguous alternatives available to the Virginia
legislature, such as the model proposed by Garrett Epps.229
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE
When faced with a criminal antiprofit law in the future, the Supreme
Court could take a number of approaches to the first amendment issue.
First, it could decide the validity of the law on a case-by-case basis,
applying the strict scrutiny test. Justice O'Connor and the majority took
this approach in Simon & Schuster.23° Under her analysis, a state must
have a compelling interest and the statute must be narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. 231 The Court found a compelling interest in compensating
victims from the "fruits of the crime. ' 232 The Court also approved a
state's interest in preventing a criminal from profiting from his crimes.2 33
A law which is narrowly drawn to achieve these ends would withstand
strict scrutiny. Although it held that New York's "Son of Sam" law was
not narrowly drawn, the Court gave no hint as to what a narrowly drawn
"Son of Sam" law should look like, or if there could even be such a law.
Virginia's statute, as written, does not appear to be narrowly drawn such
23 4
that it would satisfy the strict scrutiny test.
Second, the Court could give broad first amendment protection to
criminals by adopting Justice Kennedy's approach.235 Under his test, the
Court should only ask whether a law is content-based.236 If it is, and the
Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509-10.
Id. at 510.
221 See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.19 to .21 (Michie Supp. 1993).
229 Epps, supra note 8, at 534-35. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
230 112 S. Ct. at 508.
231 See id. at 509.
232 Id. at 511.
233 Id. at 510.
234 See supra notes 157-67, 218-28 and accompanying text.
235 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236 Id. at 513 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy , actually focused on the
"content-based" issue, but conceded that other questions must also be asked where the
compelling interest test is not applied. Those questions include: (1) "whether some other
constitutional right is impaired," (2) "whether, in the case of a regulation of activity
which combines expressive with nonexpressive elements, the regulation aims at the
226
227
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speech does not fall within one of the unprotected categories,237 the law is
unconstitutional. It is difficult to imagine a "Son of Sam" law which
could survive such a broad first amendment analysis.
In addition to the approaches employed by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, commentators have posited other precedent to which the Court
might look in examining "Son of Sam" laws. 238 The Court could consider

the line of cases involving the constructive trust theory.239 Preventing
unjust enrichment constitutes the cornerstone of this approach. Garrett
Epps advanced the constructive trust alternative as support for a Supreme
Court decision which would uphold the validity of "Son of Sam" laws. 24°
Epps would base a constructive trust decision in the "Son of Sam"
context on Snepp v. United States.24 '
Snepp, an ex-CIA case officer, agreed not to reveal any classified
information which he had learned while an employee of the CIA.242 He
further agreed to let the CIA review anything he wrote prior to
publication.243 Thus, when Snepp wrote a book discussing information
about which he agreed not to write, the government claimed that Snepp
had breached a contract. 2 " If a person agrees not to speak about certain
things, one would think that he has voluntarily given up his right to free
speech under the First Amendment. Moreover, even if the right to free
speech was abridged in Snepp, the classified information at the core of the
case could probably be characterized as speech "calculated or likely to
bring about imminent harm"-speech which the government has the power
to regulate in spite of the First Amendment.245
The Virginia "Son of Sam" law involves no contract. Rather it imposes a penalty on a criminal who tells and sells the story of his crimes.
It applies to indirect profits of a crime. The "Son of Sam" law has a
chilling effect on speech by giving the criminal no financial incentive to
speak. Furthermore, the "Son of Sam" law does not deal with a category

activity or the expression," and (3) "whether the regulation restricts speech itself or only
the time, place, or manner of speech." Id. at 514-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237 Obscenity, defamation, and incitement fall within categories of speech which are
not constitutionally protected. See id. at 514 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
238 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 8; Okuda, supra note 28.
239

Epps has suggested this as an approach the Court could take in ruling on the

constitutionality of criminal antiprofit laws. See Epps, supra note 8, at 522-24.
240 id.
24' 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
242 Id. at 507-08.
243 id.

244 See generally id.
245

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 513 (1991)

(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of speech that the Court has allowed states to restrict. 246 Therefore, even
under the Snepp approach, Virginia's "Son of Sam" law might not
withstand constitutional attack.
Other cases have upheld the validity of constructive trusts. 47 Courts
have conceded that constructive trusts are permissible in cases such as
Riggs v. Palmer.248 In Riggs, a sixteen year-old boy murdered his grandfather to prevent him from changing his will. 249 The New York court held
that the boy should take his legacy impressed with a constructive
trust because a murderer should not be allowed to profit from his crime.250
The Riggs scenario differs from the situation in which a criminal has
his profits subjected to forfeiture because he has written about the story of
his crime. Riggs-type situations involve the direct profits of a crime in the
form of a legacy, bequest, or intestate share. The murder results directly
in enrichment of the murderer. On the other hand, in the criminal
storyteller context, the profits of the crime are indirect. The criminal does
not receive a financial benefit by inflicting bodily harm on or killing
another. Rather, the criminal who later tells the story of the crime is the
one with whom the law is concerned. Most importantly, only speechrelated activities invoke the forfeiture provisions of the "Son of Sam"
law. The laws which prevent a murderer from receiving a legacy or
bequest from the victim do not implicate speech.
According to Epps, a law that requires a criminal to surrender proceeds
obtained in violation of a federal drug law could also have precedential
value in convincing the Court to uphold "Son of Sam" laws under a
constructive trust approach.25 ' Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States252 involved a law firm which was paid by a drug defendant client
with monies subject to relinquishment under a federal law. 253 The Supreme
Court, while acknowledging the burden on a criminal's sixth amendment
right to counsel, found that the burden was sufferable because of the
Government's important interests in raising money for law enforcement,
preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes, and making assets
available for restitution.254

'46

See supra notes 133, 237 and accompanying text.

247

Epps, supra note 8, at 524-28.

248

22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).

249

Id. at 188-89.

250

Id. at 190. The court observed that "[nio one shall be permitted to profit by his

own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own
iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime." Id.
251 Epps, supra note 8, at 526-28.
252

491 U.S. 617 (1989).

253

Id. at 619-20.
Id. at 629-30.

254
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Again, the Virginia "Son of Sam" law is distinguishable. The federal
law at issue in Caplin & Drysdale required forfeiture of the direct
proceeds of the drug crime-the property and money which the criminal
obtained from violating the federal drug laws. 55 The Virginia "Son of
Sam" law involves the indirect profits of crime-those profits obtained
from storytelling about the crime. Although the federal drug law does not
restrict speech in any way, the Court acknowledged that it does impose a
burden on the sixth amendment right to counsel.256 The Court concluded
that one constitutional right is as important as the next and there is no
"hierarchy" among rights. 2 7 Nevertheless, the Court held constitutional
the federal law demanding relinquishment of the profits of a drug crime.258
This opinion lends support to the argument that "Son of Sam" laws like
Virginia's are constitutional.
Okuda has suggested another approach. 25 9 That approach involves
application of the test enunciated in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc. to challenges of the constitutionality of "Son of Sam" laws.26 ' In
Renton, the Supreme Court examined a law that had only a secondary
effect on speech but that was not aimed at speech itself. 262 The Court held
that laws with an indirect effect on speech are constitutional if the
government asserts a substantial interest and other means of communication remain open.263 In applying this test to "Son of Sam" laws, the
Court should also consider whether the government has employed the least
restrictive means available for meeting the state's interest. 2 4
Although at least one commentator has argued in favor of the
constitutionality of "Son of Sam" laws under the "secondary effects"
analysis of Renton,265 Virginia's "Son of Sam" law should be held

255 See
256

257

21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 629-30.
Id. at 628. The Court reasoned that:

[i]f defendants have a right to spend forfeitable assets on attorney's fees, why not
on exercises of the right to speak, practice one's religion, or travel? The full
exercise of these rights, too, depends in part on one's financial wherewithal; and
forfeiture, or even the threat of forfeiture, may similarly prevent a defendant from
enjoying these rights as fully as he might otherwise. Nonetheless, we are not about
to recognize an antiforfeiture exception for the exercise of each such right.
Id. (emphasis added).
258 Id. at 635.
259 Okuda, supra note 28, at 1366-68.

475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Okuda, supra note 28, at 1366-68.
126 Id. at 1366.
263 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, 62.
264 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
265 Okuda, supra note 28, at 1366-68. In her Comment, Okuda argues that California's
260
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invalid under this test because the statute does not employ the least
restrictive means available.266 Traditional tort claims,267 and perhaps a
statute similar to New York's revised "Son of Sam" law,268 are less
restrictive approaches. Moreover, "Son of Sam" laws generally do not
leave other avenues of communication open because they attempt to apply
to all media outlets.269
VII. CONCLUSION

Under any of the approaches discussed above, the Commonwealth of
Virginia, or any state, would be hard-pressed to convince the United States
Supreme Court that its "Son of Sam" law is constitutional. Although the
Court has allowed states to make in-roads into the protected area of the
First Amendment, the current Court seems unlikely to continue that trend.
Kennedy's near-absolute protection of free speech and O'Connor's strict
scrutiny analysis put the burden on the state to fashion a neutral law for
the compensation of victims. Virginia's "Son of Sam" law, as written,
is unconstitutional under any analysis.
The Court should adopt Justice Kennedy's approach in Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. State Crime Victims Board270 if it must decide the validity
of a "Son of Sam" law in the future. A content-based law should be
struck down. If the law is content-neutral, Kennedy concedes that other
approaches, including the compelling interest test, might be acceptable. 271

"Dan White" law is constitutional under the Renton "secondary effects" analysis.
First, she asserts that the state has an interest in compensating victims, preventing a
convicted criminal from being unjustly enriched, reducing the burden on society of
supporting victims in social programs, giving the victim an opportunity for justice and
retribution, and making the criminal aware of the results of his crime. Id. at 1367. The
California law is narrowly tailored; it applies only to convicted felons, requires victims
to prove damages before they will be compensated, and applies to the story of the felony
for which the criminal was convicted. Id. at 1367-68. In addition, the California scheme
does not turn on the speaker's viewpoint. Id. at 1368. Okuda further contends that the
statute does not limit speech. Id. In theory, Okuda concludes, all avenues of
communication remain open. Id. Furthermore, the law does not prohibit or limit access
to the media, and it only operates after the criminal has told his story to the media. Id.
266 See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 68 (discussing rationale pertaining to standard of
review).
267 See, e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text.
268 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (Consol. Supp. 1992-93); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a
(Consol. 1983), repealed by 1992 N.Y. Laws ch. 618, § 10 (Consol. 1992).
269 See, e.g., supra notes 36, 188.
270 112 S. Ct. 501, 512-15 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
271 See id. at 513-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the use of the
compelling interest test, or one like it, in many first amendment cases, but noting that
none of those cases had at issue a content-based law).
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Although the state has interests in protecting and compensating victims,
less restrictive alternatives are available to meet these concerns. For
example, a statute that provides access to all of a criminal's assets would
give victims a better opportunity for full compensation. A longer statute
of limitations for the tort remedies would also meet victim compensation
goals.
The state's concern with preventing criminals from reaping the profits
of their crimes could also be met by less restrictive alternatives. A law
making a criminal's assets available to his victims would deal effectively
with this interest. Increasing the statute of limitations for tort remedies,
however, would not be necessary to meet this goal.
The state's interests, while important, have no place in Kennedy's
approach because once the Court concludes that a law is content-based, it
should strike it down as unconstitutional.272 Under Kennedy's contentbased analysis, the criminal's first amendment right to free speech
controls. Kennedy opposes ad hoc, case-by-case balancing by the Court,
while accepting the limits of the content-based inquiry-namely, that a state
may restrict the right to speech on the basis of content where obscenity,
defamation, incitement to violence, or other unprotected speech is at
issue.27 3 Thus, the state can meet its interests within the limits set by
traditional first amendment jurisprudence. This solution makes the most
sense and is in keeping with first amendment precedents.274

272 The content-based approach is limited. See supra note 133.
273
274

Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 514 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Adopting Kennedy's analysis, however, will require a departure from the Simon &

Schuster holding. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.

